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Direct copyright infringement attracts strict liability. However,
as a theoretical matter, it is not necessarily clear why. Legislatures
and courts have typically imposed strict liability where: (a) a defendant
has notice of a plaintiff's rights, particularly where those rights involve
a property interest; (b) a mens rea requirement on the part of the
defendant would create an untenable burden on the plaintiff; (c) it is
easier for the defendant to avoid harming the plaintiff than it is for the
plaintiff to avoid the harm; or, (d) it is more administratively or
economically efficient for the defendant to bear the risk of the loss.
Most of these rationales have been applied at one time or another to
copyright law. This Article considers whether it is appropriate to
reconsider strict liability in copyright, particularly in the context of
today's cut and paste' digital culture. The Author outlines some
potential options for reform to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine in
appropriate circumstances.
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Historically, copyright infringement claims have been litigated
on a strict liability basis.1 The idea of the "innocent infringer" has
generally been relevant only in the context of copyright remedies.2
Judges and commentators have advanced various theoretical
justifications for strict liability in copyright law.3 Because the United
States has maintained a copyright registration system, there may be a
stronger case for strict liability here than in the majority of other
jurisdictions where notice of registration is not a factor.4 If it is
reasonable to expect copyright holders to go through the relatively
minor costs and formalities associated with registering a copyright, it
seems equally reasonable to expect defendants to check the register
before making use of a protected work and to be held strictly liable if
they fail to do so. 5 However, even in jurisdictions without copyright
registration systems, it may be possible to justify strict liability on
other grounds.6
This Article examines strict liability for copyright
infringement, both historically and in the digital age. The application
of strict liability to digital technologies is particularly troubling
1. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 539 (5th ed. 2010) ("In
general, infringement with innocent intent is not a defense to a finding of [copyright
infringement] liability. . . . [I]nfringement of copyright is a strict liability rule, where the intent
of the copier is not relevant in determining the fact of liability."); Kent Sinclair, Jr., Liability for
Copyright Infringement- Handling Innocence in a Strict-Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940,
944 (1970) ('The rule is well established in copyright law that lack of intention to infringe is not
a defense to an action for infringement. . . . Similarly, the absence of negligence does not excuse
infringement. It has been held that direct copying of copyrighted matter is fully actionable even
if the infringement is committed in the thoroughly reasonable belief that the material is in the
public domain. Neither lack of intent nor negligence is a defense in situations of indirect copying,
innocent printing and selling, or infringing acts of employees.").
2. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (Matthew
Bender, ed., 2010) (noting that the innocence of the defendant "may ... bear upon the remedies
available against such a defendant").
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
4. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 271 ("Copyright registration ... is a unique feature of
American law.")
5. See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("When, as in copyright,
the law provides a form of notice, it imposes upon every one at his peril the duty to learn the
facts conveyed by the notice.").
6. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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because these technologies are largely based on mechanical and often
involuntary copying7 of software code and program outputs (e.g.,
graphics, audio, text).8
Part I considers the most salient theoretical justifications for
strict liability in the copyright context. This Part also critiques strict
liability as applied to the "innocent infringer."9 Part II examines the
strict liability doctrine in various digital contexts. Part III suggests
new approaches to copyright liability that might mitigate the
harshness of the strict liability doctrine. These approaches include:
(a) adopting "innocent infringement" as a new defense to copyright
infringement; (b) adding an intent requirement as an element of the
direct infringement action; (c) giving an administrative agency the
power to exempt certain infringements from copyright liability; and
(d) enacting specific legislative exemptions from liability for certain
classes of online conduct. The conclusion summarizes arguments for
and against strict liability in the copyright context and identifies
issues for future consideration by legislatures and the courts.
I. STRICT LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Theoretical Justifications for Strict Liability
Judges and scholars have employed various theoretical
justifications to explain why copyright infringement attracts strict
liability. Strict liability is often premised on equating a copyright
with a personal property right.10 While some uncertainty has existed
in American copyright law as to the proprietary status of copyrights,"
many other jurisdictions are more willing to expressly extend a
personal property label to copyrights. 12 The property classification
plays into strict liability in two distinct but related ways. First, where
7. See discussion of automatic, non-volitional copying infra Part II.B.
8. See Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 286 (2009) ("Strict punishment of
copying makes no sense in a world where copying is the architecture of being.").
9. See discussion of definition of "innocent infringer" infra Part I.B.
10. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 1, at 945 ('The concept of absolute liability for
infringement appears to have stemmed from the early view that no property was more
emphatically a man's own than his literary works, and that therefore they must be afforded legal
protection to the same extent as his real or personal property.").
11. See, e.g., Dane Ciolino & Erin Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 365-70 (2002); Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property? 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 29 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 196 (Austl.) ("Copyright is personal property
and . . . is transmissible by assignment, by will, and by devolution by operation of law.");
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 5, § 90(1) (U.K.) ("Copyright is transmissible by
assignment, by testamentary disposition, or by operation of law as personal or moveable
property.").
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the property in question is subject to a registration system-such as
the U.S. copyright system-the defendant is arguably given notice of
the property right, so the burden falls on her to avoid infringing the
right. 13 Second, strict liability has generally attached to interference
with a property holder's enjoyment of her property-for example,
through conversion or trespass-because "the injury to a property
interest is worthy of redress, regardless of the innocence of the
defendant." 4
Commentators have also raised an economic "loss avoidance,"
or administrative efficiency argument to justify strict liability in the
copyright infringement context, 15 reasoning that as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, the latter can best avoid the loss. 16 Some
commentators have even suggested that a defendant accused of
unconscious copying is better placed to avoid the infringement than
the copyright holder,17 arguing that the defendant could "avoid such
copying at fairly low cost, with just a bit more vigilance.""'
Proponents of this theory suggest that "as between [copyright] owners
and infringers, it is more efficient for infringers to bear the costs of
infringement."19 Infringers can exercise heightened due diligence as
to copyright ownership and may be able to insure against liability.2 0
Strict liability in copyright may also be necessary to
circumvent the inherent difficulty of establishing a defendant's
13. See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("When, as in copyright,
the law provides a form of notice, it imposes upon every one at his peril the duty to learn the
facts conveyed by the notice."). But note that modern day copyright laws, including American
law, no longer require strict systems of registration and notice. See Ciolino & Donelon, supra
note 11, at 354 ("[E]arly copyright laws, unlike modern American copyright law, provided
significant safeguards for innocent infringers through strict systems of recordation and notice.").
14. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 376-88.
16. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 354 ("Scholars have contended that strict
liability is necessary because an infringer is best able to 'avoid the loss' of infringement, and that
strict liability somehow fosters administrative efficiency."); Sinclair, supra note 1, at 952 ("[The
argument is advanced on several levels that of the two innocent parties, infringer and damaged
proprietor, the infringer is usually in a better position to protect against the chance of
infringement.").
17. Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1029 (1990) (commenting on PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989)).
18. Id.
19. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 376 (citing EATON DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES,
403 (1972)); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 ("[A]s between two innocent parties (i.e., the
copyright owner and the innocent infringer) it is the latter who should suffer because he, unlike
the copyright owner, either has an opportunity to guard against the infringement by diligent
inquiry, or at least the ability to guard against liability for infringement by an indemnity
agreement from his supplier or by an 'errors and omissions' insurance policy.").
20. See id. at 376-77.
[Vol. 13:4:767770
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culpable state of mind.21 In particular, if a defendant decides to lie
about her state of mind, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the
copyright owner to disprove the defendant's claim.22
The "enterprise liability" theory is another basis for a strict
liability in copyright, limited to cases in which a copyright owner
suffers an actual loSS 2 3: "Since the copyright proprietor is himself an
innocent party, purely as a matter of justice it seems that he should
not be made to bear the damage caused by another party."2 4 This
approach is premised on the idea that the infringer should bear the
costs of the loss when she has introduced the risk into the community
and, in so doing, has caused harm to others.25
In a related argument, some commentators have theorized that
a restitution or unjust enrichment approach to copyright infringement
might support strict liability. Professor Wendy Gordon, who has
written extensively on the notion of unjust enrichment in intellectual
property, describes unjust enrichment policy:
The central goal of restitution is to prevent "the unjust enrichment of one person at the
expense of another." Thus restitution usually is available only where a defendant has
been enriched unjustly and at the plaintiffs expense. To fulfill the latter requirement, a
restitution plaintiff usually must show either some loss to herself or the violation of
some "legally protected interest."
2 6
As with the enterprise liability explanation of strict liability,
the unjust enrichment theory requires harm to the plaintiff, which
21. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 950 ("[I]t is sometimes suggested that innocence is easy for
the defendant to allege and difficult for the plaintiff to disprove."); Snow, supra note 8, at 299
("In real space, strict liability is warranted because circumstances giving rise to a reasonable
mistake of fact about whether copying is permissible can be difficult to disprove. The difficulty of
proof arises because in real space only exceptional circumstances could lead a person to
mistakenly believe that copying is authorized. An oft-cited example is subconscious copying: an
infringer might forget that she has seen a copyrighted image and then subconsciously copy the
image when creating a new work. Disproving a false allegation that her infringement results
from subconscious copying would be pragmatically impossible, for only the infringer knows her
consciousness.").
22. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1028 (noting that the idea of an "unconscious copying"
excuse or defense to a copyright infringement "might encourage a deliberate copyist simply to lie
about his state of mind"). Furthermore, "a plea of innocence in a copyright action may often be
easy to claim and difficult to disprove." BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 120 (1995).
23. See Sinclair, supra note 1, at 954. ("This justification for imposing liability is a
simple enterprise liability argument: since the infringer introduces the risk into the community,
he should be made to bear the loss when accidental harm occurs to others as a result of his
activities.").
24. Id. at 953.
25. Id. at 954. ("[S]ince the infringer introduces the risk into the community, he should
be made to bear the loss when accidental harm to others occurs as a result of his activities.").
26. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 196-97 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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may be difficult to establish in practice. 27 As Professor Gordon notes,
it is often extremely difficult in an intellectual property case to
establish whether a plaintiff intellectual property producer would
have made the product available to the defendant without charging a
fee. 2 8 In the absence of this knowledge, it is often difficult to know
whether or not the defendant's activities were at the plaintiffs
expense.29  Like the enterprise liability approach, an unjust
enrichment theory might only justify the imposition of strict liability
in cases where it is possible to prove enrichment to the defendant at
the plaintiffs expense.30 In practice, these cases may be few and far
between.
Finally, one might argue that strict liability deters future
infringements. However, this argument is not particularly strong. As
one commentator has noted, where innocent infringers are concerned,
"[t]he assertion that someone who has no reason to know that he is
violating another's rights will be deterred from doing so by strict
liability needs only to be fully formulated to be seen as a fallacy."31
B. Strict Liability and the Innocent Infringer
A number of commentators have critiqued the strict liability
doctrine in copyright law, particularly with respect to "innocent
infringers."32 The term "innocent infringer" can refer to a number of
distinct classes of defendants. Several commentators have attempted
to create a general definition of the term. The salient underlying
theme in most of these definitions is a defendant who infringes a
27. Id. at 184. ("Some have argued that the availability of restitution for unrequested
services should depend, at least in part, on whether the defendant would have agreed to pay for
the services had the parties been able to bargain in advance, and it is not clear that intellectual
property producers often could make such a showing when they demand payment from persons
who copy their databases, designs, or inventions.").
28. Id.
29. Id. ("In the real world, it may be impossible to know whether a given work or a
given use would have been sold with a royalty promise attached."); see also Sinclair, supra note
1, at 984 (noting that fear of unjust enrichment is not an appropriate basis for imposing strict
liability on copyright infringers).
30. Gordon, supra note 26, at 184.
31. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 984.
32. For a discussion of innocent infringers in the copyright context, see LEAFFER, supra
note 1, at 539 (discussing relevance of "innocent intent" in American copyright law); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.08 (discussing the lack of an "innocent intent" defense in American
copyright law); Gordon, supra note 17, at 1028-32; Innocent Participants in Copyright
Infringement, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 400 (1939); Alan Lautman & William S. Tager, Liability of
Innocent Infringers of Copyrights, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT (1963); Sinclair, supra note 1; (discussing the imposition of strict liability in cases of
subconscious copying).
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copyright without intending to do so and without having a reason to
suspect that she is doing So.33
The main classes of cases in which "innocent infringement"
may arise in practice can be summarized as follows. First, there are
cases of "unconscious" or "subconscious" copying in which the
defendant's expression is copied from the plaintiffs original work, but
the defendant has, in good faith, forgotten the source of the work.34
Second, innocent infringement occurs when the defendant has, in good
faith, copied material received from a third party, believing it to be
original material or that the third party is otherwise authorized to
give permission to copy.35  Finally, the third category includes
deliberate copying by a defendant who mistakenly believes either that
the copied material is in the public domain or that there is another
legitimate reason why the copying is not an infringement. 36
For example, a defendant may believe she is making a
legitimate fair use of the copyrighted work. 37 While the fair use
defense was historically developed at common law, it was codified in
American copyright legislation in 1976.38 The problem with this
defense in practice has been that, even since its codification, its
boundaries are notoriously difficult to establish ex ante.39 The fair use
33. See Lautman & Tager, supra note 32, at 155 ("A possible general definition of the
innocent infringer is one who invades the rights of the copyright owner without intending to do
so and without having reason to suspect that he is doing so. The basis for the innocent infringer's
ignorance will vary according to the factual situation. The consequences attached to his
innocence will similarly vary."); Sinclair, supra note 1, at 949 ("The sort of innocent infringement
which is dealt with here . . . will be that of the actor who violates the rights of the copyright
holder without intending to do so and without having any reason to suspect that he is doing so.").
34. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 (describing "unconscious copying" as a situation
"where the defendant's expression is copied from the plaintiff, but the defendant, in good faith,
has forgotten that this is the source upon which he is drawing"); Gordon, supra note 17, at 1028
(describing the "subconscious copying rule" as involving situations where liability is imposed on
"a second author or artist who was unaware he was copying from another's copyrighted work.").
35. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 539 (noting that strict liability will apply even in
situations where a defendant "has relied on a putative author's misrepresentations about the
originality of work."); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 ('Then there is the situation wherein the
defendant's work is based upon a work furnished by a third party. The defendant's ignorance
that such third party has wrongfully copied from the plaintiff will not immunize him from
liability.").
36. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 539 (noting that the strict liability approach to copyright
infringement "is particularly harsh when applied against a person who reasonably believes that
the copyrighted work is in the public domain"); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 ("[The
defendant may consciously and intentionally copy from the plaintiffs work, believing in good
faith that his conduct does not constitute an infringement of copyright.").
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (describing fair use).
38. Id.
39. See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 494 ("Practical application of § 107's four factors has
not led to predictable results. In a given case, one may find majority and dissenting opinions
disagreeing completely on the application of each factor. This is hardly surprising. The factors
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defense is intended to operate as a flexible rule of reason that caters to
changing circumstances over time.40 Thus, even though the Copyright
Act completely excuses a fair user from infringement liability,"1 it is
virtually impossible in many cases for a potential defendant to know,
prior to defending an infringement action, whether or not her use is,
in fact, properly characterized as a fair use. Even if the defendant
honestly believes she is making a fair use of a work, she will not be
excused from liability unless she can establish the defense in
litigation. There is no ex ante mechanism for establishing fair use.4 2
None of the categories of innocent infringement will immunize
a defendant from liability for copyright infringement.43 However, the
innocence of the defendant may affect the remedies available to the
plaintiff.44 For completeness, it is also worth noting that American
copyright legislation does excuse an innocent defendant in some
limited circumstances, such as where the defendant has relied in good
faith on an error in the name of the copyright holder or an omission of
a copyright notice on copies of works publicly distributed before the
implementation of the Berne Convention. 5 The statutory provision
establishing the defense in cases of reliance on an error in the
copyright holder's name attached to a copyright notice grants complete
immunity for copyright liability.46 For reliance on the omission of a
are broadly stated, overlapping, and vague, and the legislative history provides little insight as
to their meaning, what weight to give them, or how they interrelate.").
40. Id. at 494 ("According to the legislative history, the four [fair use] factors represent
a codification of fair use. One might ask why Congress would wish to codify the common law of
fair use, with all its disarray and its questionable applicability to a world of new technologies
and nonprint media. The goal was not merely to incorporate the past, but also to allow for a
flexible and dynamic future.").
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work .. is not an infringement of
copyright. . . .. ").
42. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 494 ("Practical application of § 107's four factors has not
led to predictable results.").
43. Id. at 539 ("In general, infringement with innocent intent is not a defense to a
finding of liability."); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 ("In actions for statutory copyright
infringement, the innocent intent of the defendant will not constitute a defense to a finding of
liability.").
44. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 (noting that the innocence of the defendant "may.
bear upon the remedies available against such a defendant.").
45. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 406(a) (describing exceptions to liability for "innocent
offenders" whose infringing acts involve works publicly distributed by the authorized copyright
holder before the implementation of the Berne Convention).
46. Id. § 406(a); see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 539 ("The one exception to the
general [strict liability] rule is found in § 406(a), which provides a complete defense to copyright
infringement to the person who has relied in good faith on an error in name on the notice of
certain copies or phonorecords publicly distributed before the Berne Convention Implementation
Act.").
774
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copyright notice, the provision immunizes the defendant only for
actual or statutory damages. 4 7
C. Critiquing Strict Liability
While many use property analogies to justify strict liability in
copyright law, 4 8 the extension of strict liability concepts from physical
property laws may not suit the realities of copyright. There is no clear
consensus that copyright should be viewed as property in the same
sense as realty or personalty. 49  The confusion about whether
intellectual products should be granted a property label derives from
the tendency of courts to equate the concept of "value" with the
concept of "property."50 If "value equals property," then, as Professor
Gordon argues, there are effectively "no usable limits" inherent in the
property concept.51
Even if it is correct to equate copyright with physical property
as a theoretical matter, imposing strict liability for copyright
infringement is arguably misplaced. Some commentators have
pointed out that real property systems have become more
accommodating to innocent infringers than copyright law. 52 Thus, the
application of strict liability in the copyright context no longer makes
sense compared to the leniency now built into, for example, real
property trespass. 5 3
47. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b); see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 539 ("In one situation, the
Copyright Act moderates the harshness of the 'no innocent defense' rule. Section 405(b) of the
Act provides that an innocent infringer who can show that it was misled by the omission of a
notice on copies publicly distributed before the effective date of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act (March 1, 1989) will not be liable for actual or statutory damages.").
48. See Sinclair, supra note 1, at 950 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 148 (1970) ("[I]t is said that innocence 'should no more constitute a defense in an
infringement action, whether statutory or common law, than in the case of conversion of tangible
personalty."').
49. See Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 354 ("[Clopyright law, its entitlement, and
its subject matter differ significantly from traditional property law, its entitlement, and its
subject matter."); Sinclair, supra note 1, at 950 ("It is not at all clear that copyrights should be
viewed as property in the sense in which conversion would be an applicable concept.").
50. Gordon, supra note 26, at 179-80 (discussing cases in which conclusions have been
drawn that an intangible product is appropriately classified as "property" because of its
commercial "value").
51. Id. at 180. ("[Tjhe perception that 'value is property' likely will not yield any usable
limits.").
52. See, e.g., Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 354 ("[C]opyright infringement is
frequently analogized to 'trespass to realty.' Although the simplicity of this analogy is appealing,
it is deeply flawed. Modern laws governing tangible property are far more accommodating and
forgiving of its innocent trespassers than copyright law is of its own.").
53. See id. at 369 ("To the extent that tangible property law is sufficiently similar to
copyright law to justify similar legal treatment, then the law should treat the two similarly.
However, with regard to culpability, it does not. Copyright law is neither as accommodating nor
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 13:4:767
Further, if the most persuasive arguments for strict liability
are premised on compensating an author for diminution of the value of
her property, under the enterprise liability and unjust enrichment
rationales, this reasoning may be faulty.54 The differences between
physical property and intellectual property suggest that just because a
strict liability approach may be available in one case, it is not
necessarily apposite in the case of valuable intangible property.5 5
It is much easier in the case of rivalrouS56 physical property for
the owner to establish clear rights: The fact that real property is
fenced in or developed suggests a property right.57 The fact that
personalty is usually situated in the possession of a given actor also
suggests ownership.58 In contrast, not all copyrighted works even
contain copyright notices or license terms,59 so it is often difficult for a
as forgiving of the innocent and ignorant as is traditional property law. Although 'innocence is no
defense' to the trespass of copyright infringement, innocence is frequently a mitigating factor or
a complete defense to trespass, conversion and other laws affecting tangible property.").
54. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 984. ('The goal of compensating the author for diminution
of the value of his property is the only serious reason for refusal to fully exempt innocent
infringers. . . . The assertion that someone who has no reason to know that he is violating
another's rights will be deterred from doing so by strict liability needs only to be fully formulated
to be seen as a fallacy.").
55. Id.
56. See Lawrence Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822
(2010) ("'Rivalrousness' is a property of the consumption of a good. Consumption of a good is
rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the opportunity of other individuals, Y,
Z, etc., to consume the good. Some goods are rivalrous because they are 'used up.' If I drink a
glass of Heitz Martha's Vineyard, then you cannot drink that same glass of wine. If I set off a
firecracker, you cannot set off the same firecracker. Other goods are rivalrous because of
crowding effects. If I am using the free Internet terminal at the student lounge, then you cannot
use the same time slice of the terminal- because only one person can sit in front of the screen at
the same time.").
57. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 374. ("[Tjhe copyright-as-property analogy is
flawed because copyright law, unlike tangible property law, suffers from a severe lack of
demarcation. Boundaries establishing the limits of property rights provide advance notice when
an act will give rise to rights and obligations established by property law. For example, 'fences,'
'property lines,' and title records clearly define the boundaries of traditional property. Because of
the importance of boundaries, rights affecting tangible property, such as liability for criminal
trespass of tangible property and acquisition of property through adverse possession, have
historically hinged on the posting of boundaries or on 'open and notorious' possession.
Unfortunately, works of authorship bear no similar delimiting markings, boundaries or other
demarcation.").
58. Carole Brown & Serena Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession: An Essay on
Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 584 (2010). ("Over time, possession grew to
be very connected to ownership and legal rules developed to protect the interests of possessors
against interference from strangers and even out-of-possession owners. Roman law recognized
that a possessor, one without dominion, which again, was the equivalent of ownership, could
acquire dominion (legal ownership) based upon possession for a sufficiently long time.").
59. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 143 (noting that with the passing of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act in 1988, notice is no longer required on copyright works in the
United States).
776
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potential defendant to establish ownership or the terms on which the
owner would allow copying without compensation.
As tangible property exists in only one place at one time, its
misappropriation fairly obviously results in a loss to its owner.
However, copyrights are nonrivalrous and can exist in multiple places
at one time.60 The making of a copy of a protected work by a
defendant may or may not impact the copyright holder in any
significant way.61 Thus, the loss-benefit equation that can generally
be assumed in cases of interference with a physical property right will
often not apply to copyright infringement. 62
The tendency to equate physical property with copyright in the
strict liability context may arise from the existence of registration-
and-notice schemes in both physical property and some copyright
regimes. 63 Prior to implementing the requirements of the Berne
Convention, 64 the American copyright system relied heavily on
notice.65 Even modern American copyright law maintains a copyright
register, unlike most other jurisdictions. 66 A brief survey of early
60. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 371-72. ("[T]he copyright-as-property analogy
is flawed because the things protected by each body of law are dissimilar. Unlike most tangible
property, copyrighted works of authorship are 'public goods' which are both 'nonexcludable' and
'inexhaustible.' As nonexcludable public goods, copyrights can be enjoyed by a 'second user' at
little or no additional cost. As inexhaustible public goods, copyrights can be used- and reused-
with virtually no diminution in value to either the author or the potential user.").
61. Id.
62. Id. at 372 ("Because copyrighted works are nonexcludable and inexhaustible public
goods, the property rights in works of authorship created by copyright law are significantly
weaker than the rights in tangible property. For example, unlike tangible property law,
copyright law sometimes permits the public to use copyrighted works for free or upon the
payment of a statutory royalty. Because another's use of a nonexcludable work of authorship
does not prevent the owner from simultaneously using it, copyright law should, and does, treat
intentional takers less harshly than tangible property law treats its unwanted interlopers.").
63. Id. at 359-60 ("[The Statute of Anne, 1710, Eng.] contained stringent registration
and notice requirements intended to protect the innocent from liability. Penalties for
infringement were expressly conditioned on the pre-publication registration of the title of the
copyrighted work in the registry of the Stationers' Company. This registry of works was designed
to be easily accessible and available for inspection, without 'fee or charge,' by any 'bookseller,
printer, or other person,' at all 'seasonable and convenient times.' Subsequent British legislation
required that notice of registration appear on every copyrighted work. And, as further protection
of the 'ignorant' infringer, assignments of copyrights were likewise subject to these strict
recordation requirements.").
64. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works July 24, 1971,
102 Stat. 2853, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
65. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 285 ("Under the 1909 Act, federal statutory copyright
began not on registration but when the work was published with proper notice. Section 13 of the
1909 Act provided that once a work was copyrighted by publication with notice, 'there shall be
promptly deposited' the required copies and the claim for registration.").
66. 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2006) (setting out registration formalities under United States
copyright legislation); LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 271 ("Copyright registration (and the important
role it plays) is a unique feature of American law. The act of registration does not create a
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American copyright cases suggests that the notice-and-registration
system was a major factor in decisions supporting the strict liability
approach to infringement. 67  Thus, whether a copyright is
appropriately labeled as a property right may be less significant to the
strict liability question than the fact that, like many real property
systems, the American copyright system has traditionally provided
express notice of rights to third parties.
Nevertheless, it seems that registration and notice are a
questionable basis for justifying strict liability in the copyright
system. For one thing, most jurisdictions do not have a copyright
registration system. 68 Thus, even if registration and notice could
explain the historical basis of strict liability in the United States, it
fails to justify strict liability at a more global level. Additionally, since
the United States implemented the Berne Convention, a copyright
owner can assert her rights without registration or notice, 69 although
failure to register will significantly curtail the available remedies.70
Apart from the difficulty of analogizing copyrighted works and
physical property, there are other reasons to question the strict
liability doctrine in modern copyright law. The argument that the
innocent infringer is better able than the copyright holder to avoid the
loss may well be fallacious. Copyright law is vague and complex.71
Many innocent infringers, particularly those who believe, perhaps
erroneously, that they are making a legitimate fair use of a work,72 or
copyright; copyright begins when an author fixes his work in a tangible medium of expression.
Registration, however, can be critically important to the copyright owner because it can preserve
copyright, and for works that originated in the United States, it is a prerequisite for bringing an
infringement suit.").
67. See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("When, as in copyright,
the law provides a form of notice, it imposes upon every one [sic] at his peril the duty to learn the
facts conveyed by the notice."); Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 175 F. 282, 282-83
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) ("It is not necessary that the defendant should have intended to violate the
copyright of the plaintiff. He had means of knowledge from the copyright office that the song had
been in fact copyrighted; and he, like anyone else, took his chances when he published the song
without any inquiry.").
68. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.01[A] (Matthew
Bender, ed., 2010) (noting that the United States has been unique in maintaining a copyright
registration system).
69. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 375 ("[C]opyright law no longer mandates
notice and registration. The elimination of these requirements . . . has rendered current
copyright law a fenceless barren.").
70. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 (noting that the innocence of the defendant "may.
bear upon the remedies available against such a defendant.").
71. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 381-82 ("[C]opyright law is exceedingly
complex and fraught with inconsistency and ambiguity.").
72. Id. at 413 (noting that an innocent infringer may mistakenly believe she is making a
fair use of the copyright work).
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who are not aware that they are borrowing from a protected work, 73
may find it very difficult to avoid infringement.74
Similarly, economic efficiency justifications for strict liability in
copyright may not withstand close scrutiny. It is unclear in practice
that it is more economically efficient for innocent infringers to bear
the costs of infringement.75 The argument in favor of strict liability
relies on the fact that the infringer might take measures to avoid
infringement such as investigating whether a work is copyrighted, or
taking out indemnity insurance.76  This approach borrows
significantly from tort law, where certain torts warrant strict liability
because the tortfeasor is the cheapest cost-avoider of particular
accidents and injuries.77
However, it is questionable whether the same logic applies in
the context of innocent copyright infringers. Many cases of innocent
infringement involve defendants who had no means of knowing about
the copyright infringement.78  Unlike large-scale commercial
manufacturers and distributors of potentially dangerous products in
tort law, many copyright infringers are small-scale creators with little
or no knowledge of the intricacies of copyright law. 7 9 While tort law
mitigates the harshness of strict liability by limiting its application to
73. Id. at 354 ("Innocent infringers, often unaware of the vagaries of copyright law or
unaware that they are borrowing from copyrighted sources, are often incapable of avoiding the
loss of infringement."); id. at 382-84 ("[An infringer] may reasonable be deceived by false claims
of ownership from another and be held liable for copyright infringement. She may assume that
she is using public domain material, either because it was once copyrighted but has since lost its
protection, or because the material consist of any one of many non-copyrightable categories of
expression such as facts, ideas, utilitarian function, or scenes A faire.").
74. Id. at 354, 382-84.
75. Id. at 376 ("Commentators viewing strict liability in copyright from a law-and-
economics perspective have argued that strict liability is appropriate under 'loss avoidance'
theory. Analogous to the 'cheapest cost avoider' principle in tort law, loss avoidance theory
justifies strict liability on the basis that as between owners and infringers, it is more efficient for
infringers to bear the costs of infringement.").
76. Id. at 376-77 ("Under [the economic efficiency or loss avoidance theory], strict
liability is warranted because potential infringers are better able to avert infringement by, for
example, taking precautionary measures such as inquiring into whether the work in question is
copyrighted, or, by obtaining insurance for indemnity in the case of innocent infringement.").
77. Id. at 377-78 ("Scholars . . . have long advocated holding manufacturers of products
liable without fault because they are presumably the 'cheapest . . . cost avoiders' of accidents and
injuries. According to this theory, injurers are appropriately held strictly liable because they
were in 'the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."' (quoting Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972))).
78. Id. at 378 ("Perhaps the most obvious and fundamental flaw in the loss avoidance
justification [for strict liability in copyright law] stems from the very ignorance or innocence of
some infringers. As a practical matter, an innocent infringer is incapable of avoiding
infringement of which she is entirely unaware.").
79. Id.
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particularly dangerous activities, copyright law does not similarly
limit the application of strict liability.80
The strict liability rule affects particularly harsh results in the
case of unconscious or subconscious copying, in which the defendant
has forgotten that she is drawing on the plaintiffs work.81 To impose
strict liability in these cases on the basis of an economic efficiency
rationale effectively asks the impossible: "that in the midst of the
'creative process' an author can successfully distill from his
subconscious that portion of his work that is derived from other works
from that which is truly 'original."' 82 Professor Gordon has expressed
particular reservations about the subconscious copying doctrine based
on the nature of the creative process:
One's opinion of the subconscious copying rule may depend on one's view of the creative
process. I find it hard to imagine that subconscious copying only occurs through
carelessness, or that it can be avoided at minimal cost. Under what one might call an
"influence" view of creativity, subconscious copying occurs constantly, and usually bears
valuable fruit.
8 3
She further notes that strict liability raises particular problems in the
subconscious copying context; specifically, the available remedies for
infringement.8" If an innocent infringer were merely required to pay a
statutory royalty to the copyright holder, this would perhaps not be
such a problem. 85 However, under the "derivative works" right, the
innocent infringer is prevented from asserting copyright in her own
80. Id. at 379 ("Tort law mitigates the harshness of [strict liability] by holding actors
strictly liable for damages only when they engage in certain limited categories of activities-
typically 'ultra-hazardous' or 'unreasonably dangerous' activities such as ownership of wild
animals, the use of explosives, or the manufacture of products such as prescription drugs.
Presumably, to avoid strict liability in tort individuals can simply avoid these types of activities.
In contrast, copyright law does not similarly limit the sweep of strict liability. On the contrary,
copyright's broad strict liability regime ensnares those engaged in otherwise reasonable and
socially desirable activity- the creation of works of authorship.").
81. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 (describing "unconscious copying" as a situation
"where the defendant's expression is copied from the plaintiff, but the defendant, in good faith,
has forgotten that this is the source upon which he is drawing."); Ciolino & Donelson, supra note
11, at 379 ("Unconscious infringement is often the unfortunate result of the defendant's 'memory
playing him a trick,' causing him to forget that the plaintiffs work is actually 'the source upon
which he is drawing."').
82. Ciolino & Donelson, supra note 11, at 379-80.
83. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1030.
84. Id. at 1029 ("[T]he subconscious copying rule may operate unfairly. The person who
accidentally and in good faith replicates something heard or seen earlier is surprised by the
copyright owner's claim. Were the penalty merely a requirement that the new creator pay the
prior creator some fee for use, a finding of liability might cause little if any harm. Under
copyright law, however, the unconscious copyist is penalized much further. He has no copyright
in what he has produced if the proper work was used 'unlawfully' and pervasively, and his
aggrieved predecessor may obtain an injunction against the new project, blocking not only the




creation.86 She may also be blocked by injunction from disseminating
her own new work.87
The problems with economic efficiency justifications for strict
liability are compounded by the fact that notice and registration are
no longer technically required formalities under American copyright
law.88 This impacts the loss avoidance equation. In a system where
registration is anticipated and copyright notices are expected to be
affixed to protected works, it is much easier to argue that a defendant
is in a better position to avoid a given loss. Of course, this rationale
may still cause problems in the unconscious copying context, but at
least in the presence of a notice-and-registration system, potential
defendants may be more likely to see and recall copyright notices on
their sources. Additionally, in the absence of registration and notice
requirements, defendants may be more likely to assume that a work
that has no copyright notice lies in the public domain.89
The administrative efficiency rationale for strict liability in
copyright law has also been criticized. The idea behind this
justification for strict liability is that "innocence in a copyright action
may often be easy to claim and difficult to disprove."90 Thus, the
argument goes, in the absence of strict liability, plaintiffs would face
the unpalatable situation of infringement actions that involve costly
and drawn-out conflicts to prove the state of mind of the infringer. 91
Nevertheless, the increased amount of litigation arising as a
result of the imposition of strict liability may eclipse the gains to
individual plaintiffs as a result of maintaining the rule. 9 2  The
86. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) ("The subject matter of copyright . . . includes
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully."); LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 65-66 ("A derivative work copyright can only be
obtained when the author legally used the material on which the derivative work was based.").
87. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1029.
88. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 384 ("[T]he inconsistency inherent in a loss
avoidance rationale [for strict liability] is compounded by the elimination of the notice and
registration requirements in modern copyright law.").
89. Id. at 384-85 ("[I1n light of the fact that many copyright owners fail to affix notice to
their works- much less register them- the recent relaxation of statutory formalities adds to the
uncertainty of copyright law and serves to confound the potential infringer, who, unfamiliar with
the intricacies of copyright law, may naively assume that because her sources lack notice and are
not registered, they are in the public domain.").
90. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2.
91. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 385-86 ("Proponents of [the administrative
efficiency] justification argue that absent a strict liability framework all copyright infringement
actions will devolve into expensive and time-consuming battles of proof centered on discerning
the thoughts and motives of the alleged infringer.").
92. Id. at 388 ("Because establishing the culpability of an infringer can sometimes be a
costly and time-consuming endeavor, eliminating culpability-related issues from copyright cases
may serve to reduce the costs associated with resolving individual disputes. In so doing, however,
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availability of strict liability arguably encourages more plaintiffs to
bring copyright infringement actions, as the strict liability rule
appears on its face to make the outcome of the case more predictable
for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, copyright cases tend to be long and
involved, often requiring experts to opine on difficult questions of
fact. 93 Thus, while strict liability arguably produces efficiency gains in
individual cases, it may also increase the costs of the copyright system
overall by increasing the caseload in an area where cases tend to be
lengthy and costly.
The strict liability approach to copyright law has also been
criticized for chilling expression and innovation, 94 contrary to the goals
of copyright law.95 While copyright is intended to foster creativity, 96 a
strict liability approach can chill downstream creativity.97 Creativity
must be regarded on a continuum, because each new work builds to
some extent on preexisting works.98 Concerns about the chilling
strict liability may increase overall costs by markedly increasing the total volume of copyright
infringement claims."); id. at 390 ("[A]lthough strict liability may offer administrative cost
savings on a case-by-case basis, any savings in this regard are likely offset or overtaken by the
added costs of administering an increased number of claims.").
93. Id. at 390-91 ("[C]opyright cases are exceedingly complicated, often protracted, and
invariably expensive. The reasons for these high costs are manifold. Copyright law is considered
a 'specialty' among large law firms, with top 'intellectual property' lawyers commanding steep
hourly rates. Expert witnesses are routinely employed by both plaintiffs and defendants, often at
great expense. Copyright infringement suits, like all lawsuits, are arduous, emotional ordeals for
both plaintiff and defendant. Strict liability, although heralded for its 'ease' and efficiency, has
done little to allay these problems or to streamline this process for effective adjudication.").
94. Id. at 413 ("Strict liability overdeters lawful and beneficial uses of copyright
works."); id. at 419 ("Indeed, potential authors, wary of the draconian penalties facing even the
most innocent infringers, likely refrain both from using other works and from creating new
works, thereby reducing the demand for existing copyrighted works and the volume of original
works created.").
95. Id. at 410-11 ("Strict liability not only lacks a sound justification in copyright, it
affirmatively harms copyright's fundamental utilitarian goal. Copyright protection, according to
the Constitution, exists 'to promote the Progress of Science [and the Useful Arts].' Legislation
enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause is simply a 'means by which an important public
purpose'-the production of new works of authorship-is furthered . . . . Although performing an
indispensable market-creation function, [copyright law's] exclusive rights tug against the
overarching goal of public-access."); id. at 418-19 ("[S]trict liability is affirmatively harmful to
copyright's utilitarian goals. Copyright exists to create a 'thriving culture' that produces 'as
many original works available as possible.' But strict liability, particularly when coupled with
copyright's supercompensatory remedies, severely impedes this utilitarian purpose by inhibiting
the artistic creation that copyright law seeks to foster.").
96. Id. at 410.
97. Id.
98. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1030-31 ("With the past at the center of their work, many
artists could not function if a catalogue of that past, and lawyer-like attention to whether things
borrowed are 'idea' or 'expression,' become prerequisites for publication. As Benjamin Kaplan has
suggested, the romantic notion of independent creativity is fairly new, but has had an
unfortunately strong impact on copyright; the classical approach to art understood and honored
(albeit overmuch) the role the past plays in the new.").
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impact of strict liability in copyright take on particular significance in
cyberspace.99 As so many people globally participate in the online "cut
and paste" culture, 100 a strict liability approach to infringement can be
problematic to the development of this international communications
tool. As noted by Professor Ned Snow:
Strict liability punishment of innocent downloaders impedes a free marketplace of ideas.
The Internet has been viewed as the most participatory marketplace of ideas ever
experienced. It represents a means for inexpensively sharing ideas with the entire
world-the vehicle of cheap speech. Strict liability's potential deterrence of
downloading, then, represents a deterrence of marketplace participation.101
As modern communications technologies allow our society to interact
more globally and be creative in myriad new ways, 102 the potential
chilling effects of strict liability in copyright law become particularly
troubling.
Finally, it is not clear why courts and commentators have
historically felt that imposing a mens rea requirement on the direct
infringement action would be so problematic. Of course it is often
difficult to gauge a defendant's state of mind at a given moment in
time, and defendants can always lie about their motives for borrowing
from the work of others. 103 However, it is not immediately obvious
why these risks are more problematic in the direct infringement
context than in other aspects of infringement such as contributory
liability, which does maintain an intent requirement,104 or the fair use
defense, where courts sometimes subjectively or objectively consider
the good faith or bad faith of the defendant.105 Given that the mens
99. See discussion infra Part II.
100. Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One-
Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 864 (2008) (describing the
significance of user-generated content online and the new "cut and paste" culture).
101. Snow, supra note 8, at 311.
102. See generally Hetcher, supra note 100 (discussing the significance of user generated
culture online and the cultural shift from traditional modes of creation).
103. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1028 (noting that the idea of an "unconscious copying"
excuse or defense to a copyright infringement "might encourage a deliberate copyist simply to lie
about his state of mind").
104. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 402 ("The innocence or culpable intent of an
infringer is also relevant-and often dispositive-in cases of contributory infringement. In spite of
the longstanding 'unanimity of view' in favor of strict liability for direct and vicarious infringers
of copyright, courts premise liability for contributory infringement, in part, on the intent or
knowledge of the contributory infringer. Indeed, in stark contrast to other variants of
infringement, knowledge is the very 'touchstone' of contributory infringement.").
105. Id. at 403-04 ("Courts have long considered the motives of alleged infringers when
evaluating the defense of 'fair use.' Although not enumerated among the nonexclusive fair use
factors in the Copyright Act, 'good faith' and 'fair dealing' are factors that courts have considered
in evaluating the fairness of particular uses, with the 'bad faith' of a user militating heavily
against a finding of fair use. Likewise, courts in fair use cases have examined objective
manifestations of motive-such as whether the plaintiff's work was 'purloined,' or otherwise
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rea elements in contributory liability and fair use have not posed
insurmountable problems for plaintiffs, it is difficult to imagine why it
would be a prohibitive element for direct infringement.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN CYBERSPACE
A. Copyright in Cyberspace
The digital revolution has raised significant new challenges for
intellectual property law. From the early days of the Internet, the
application of traditional copyright law was fraught with difficulty. In
an online architecture based almost completely on copying software
code, the application of doctrines that curtail copying is extremely
problematic.106
Since the earliest days of the personal computer revolution,
courts and legislatures have faced a number of novel issues concerning
the application of copyright law to new digital technologies. 107 Law
and policymakers had to decide whether software code, the basis of
the Internet, is copyrightable. 108  If so, what were the limits of
copyright infringement where almost everything is copied as a
necessary element of system functionality? Policymakers ultimately
decided that original code is generally copyrightable. 109
Next, digital copyright law had to determine exactly what
constitutes a "copy" in the digital context. Because computers operate
by running programs, which involves making a temporary or
permanent copy of the program on the user's computer, virtually all
digital processes involve copying.110 The copying may last for a
misappropriated, and whether the defendant sought to 'pass off the work as his own.' This
emphasis on motive, although controversial, is gaining increased significance in fair use
determinations.").
106. Snow, supra note 8, at 286 ("Strict punishment of copying makes no sense in a world
where copying is the architecture of being.").
107. See, e.g., 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B
(Matthew Bender, ed., 2010) (describing new digital challenges for copyright law and
legislative/judicial responses).
108. See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 103 ("Computer programs have a different look and
feel as compared to more traditional forms of copyrightable subject matter. Reservations on this
basis concerning the wholesale inclusion of computer programs in copyright law were expressed
in the dissenting and concurring comments of Commissioners Hershey and Nimmer to the
CONTU Final Report.").
109. Id. at 105 (noting that computer programs "have received expansive [copyright]
protection in the courts"); see also Apple Computer, Inc v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1244 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that copyrights can exist in a computer program expressed in
object code, a computer program embedded in a ROM, and in an operating system program).
110. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
making a temporary copy of a program in a computer in order to diagnose and repair problems
constituted copying for the purposes of the copyright legislation).
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fleeting moment, several minutes, or much longer, depending on the
system.' Running a program to diagnose computer problems may
involve making a relatively fleeting copy, 112 whereas hosting a website
that caches digital material may involve retaining copies for weeks,
months, or even years. 113
Early digital copyright cases tended to err in favor of copyright
holders. 114 Courts had little trouble holding that making temporary
copies of a program, even copies that were not physically viewed by a
computer operator, but rather that ran in a computer's memory for
diagnostic purposes, amounted to copying for the purposes of
copyright law.115 To mitigate the harshness of these early decisions,
legislatures in a number of jurisdictions enacted exemptions from
copyright liability for various enumerated uses of computer software
such as archiving, 116 maintenance, and repair purposes. 117 Of course,
111. Id.; see also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that copying fragments of copyrighted video programs for a fleeting amount of time-
notably about 1.2 seconds-would not amount to copyright for the purposes of the copyright
legislation).
112. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511 (holding that making a temporary copy of a program
in a computer in order to diagnose and repair problems constituted copying for the purposes of
the copyright legislation); see also Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 128 (noting that in the MAI
case, "it seems fair to assume that ... the program was embodied in the RAM for at least several
minutes").
113. United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1186 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) ("A cache is a
computer memory with very short access time used for storage of frequently or recently used
instructions or data. Information is cached by placing it closer to the user or user application in
order to make it more readily and speedily available.") (internal citations omitted)).
114. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511 (holding that making a temporary copy of a program
in a computer in order to diagnose and repair problems constituted copying for the purposes of
the copyright legislation); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that an Internet service provider could be directly liable for infringing the plaintiffs
public distribution and public display rights).
115. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F. 2d 511 (holding that making a temporary copy of a program
in a computer in order to diagnose and repair problems constituted copying for the purposes of
the copyright legislation).
116. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2) (2006) ("[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program provided . . . that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful."); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 3,
§ 50A(1) (U.K.) ("It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer
program to make any back up copy of it which it is necessary for him to have for the purposes of
his lawful use.").
117. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c)(1) ("[It is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a
machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy is made
solely by virtue of the activation of a machine that lawfully contains an authorized copy of the
computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that machine, if . .. such new
copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is
completed .... ); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 3, § 50C(2) (U.K.) ("It may, in
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applying even these exceptions on a case-by-case basis and defining
exactly which uses of proprietary software should be excused have
subsequently raised their own interpretive difficulties.118
B. Direct Versus Indirect Infringement of Digital Content
The precise mechanics of a digital process would be more clear
also impact questions of direct versus indirect copyright liability. It is
not always easy to establish definitively which party is responsible for
unauthorized copying in systems within which copying is largely
automated. 119 Further, in the digital world it is often difficult to
distinguish primary or direct infringers from secondary infringers. 120
The distinction is important because certain forms of indirect
liability-notably contributory infringement-retain a mens rea
requirement on the part of the defendant while direct infringement
attracts strict liability.
In early Internet cases, courts struggled to determine whether
online service providers could be deemed direct infringers with respect
to material posted online by their customers. 121 The resulting judicial
rulings were somewhat piecemeal and inconsistent. Determinations
relied, to a large extent, on a case-by-case analysis of the operation of
the relevant online forum, and on precisely which of her exclusive
rights the copyright holder alleged had been infringed. 122 Thus, while
a defendant hosting an online bulletin board was found to have
directly infringed a copyright holder's public distribution 23 and public
display rights 124 by virtue of hosting a forum containing infringing
particular, be necessary for the lawful use of a computer program to copy it or adapt it for the
purpose of correcting errors in it.").
118. See, e.g., Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005) (interpreting the
exemptions from copyright liability in 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2)); see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at
321-24 (discussing the interpretation of statutory exemptions to infringement liability for
certain uses of copyrighted software).
119. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
120. Similar issues have recently arisen in the context of digital trademark law. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Whether
the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to be a tricky question.
However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that defendants are either directly
or contributorily liable. Under either theory, PEI's case may proceed. Thus, we need not decide
this issue.").
121. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that an
Internet service provider could be directly liable for infringing the plaintiffs public distribution
and public display rights); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an Internet service provider was not directly liable for
infringing the plaintiffs reproduction right).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting out the exclusive rights of a copyright holder).
123. Id. §106(3).
124. Id. § 106(5).
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material, 125 another similarly situated defendant was not held liable
for directly infringing a plaintiffs reproduction right. 1 2 6
In 1998, the U.S. Congress intervened in an attempt to inject
some order into determinations of an online service provider's liability
for infringement for content transiently passing through a systeml 27 or
uploaded by a third party.128 However, courts continue to struggle
with issues of direct and indirect liability in the digital context.
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. provides a somewhat complex
example of a judicial attempt to draw lines between primary and
secondary liability online. 129
Cartoon Network involved alleged copyright infringements with
respect to digital copies of television programs made with a "Remote
Storage" Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) the defendant sought to
offer its customers.130 The defendant company, Cablevision, was a
cable television broadcaster who wanted to offer the RS-DVR service
so its customers could record and remotely store copies of broadcasted
content.131 Cablevision had no license from the content providers to
make or to authorize the making of such copies.132
The RS-DVR is a hybrid technology: a cross between a
traditional set-top video recorder-like a TiVo-and a video-on-
demand or streaming video service. 133 As with a set-top recorder, the
end user could program the RS-DVR to record a desired program.134
However, unlike the set-top recorder, the defendant's service would
record and store the program on the defendant's remote servers,
rather than on the user's own set-top hard drive.135 As with a video-
on-demand service, the RS-DVR would replay the program at the end
user's request.136 However, unlike a typical video-on-demand service,
the defendant's service would only offer playback of programs the end
user had recorded, rather than of any program the user might want to
125. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (holding that an Internet service provider could be directly
liable for infringing the plaintiffs public distribution and public display rights).
126. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (holding that an Internet service provider
was not directly liable for infringing the plaintiffs reproduction right).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
128. Id. § 512(b).
129. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
130. Id. at 123-24 (describing operation of the Cablevision RS-DVR system).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 124 ("Cablevision notified its content providers, including plaintiffs, of its
plans to offer RS-DVR, but it did not seek any license from them to operate or sell the RS-DVR.").
133. Id. at 123.
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see, distinguishing the RS-DVR from a general video library service
like NetfliX137 or Hulu.138
Cartoon Network raised two distinct questions of copyright
liability. The first related to temporary buffering of content by the
defendant's servers. 139 The second involved the full recordings of the
playback copies of protected works residing on the defendant's
servers. 140 With respect to the first issue, the court addressed whether
buffering small pieces of protected data for an extremely brief period
of time (approximately 1.2 seconds)141 could amount to direct
infringement of the plaintiffs' reproduction right.142 If Cablevision had
infringed the plaintiffs reproduction rights, there would be no
question that it was the primary entity making the copies and would
therefore face direct liability for doing so. In other words, Cablevision
would be responsible as a direct infringer because it did the copying
for its own purposes, and not at the request of anyone else. Buffering
of data is simply an internal mechanism necessary to the operation of
Cablevision's technology, thus the buffering of data occurs without an
individual customer making a specific request for it to happen. This is
different from the recording of playback copies of television programs
that must be requested by a customer for Cablevision's system to
make copies of them. In any event, after revisiting the statutory
137. Unlimited TV Shows & Movies. How Does It Work?, NETFLIX,
http://www.netflix.com/HowItWorks (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) ("For only $7.99 a month,
instantly watch unlimited TV episodes & movies streaming over the Internet to your TV via an
Xbox 360, PS3, Wii or any other device that streams from Netflix. You can also watch instantly
on your PC or Mac too!").
138. HULU, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (offering selection of videos
for free online streaming).
139. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127 ("It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any
customer or other entity, takes the content from one stream of programming, after the split, and
stores it, one small piece at a time, in the BMR buffer and the primary ingest buffer. As a result,
the information is buffered before any customer requests a recording, and would be buffered even
if no such request were made. The question is whether, by buffering the data that make up a
given work, Cablevision 'reproduce[s]' that work 'in copies,' 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and thereby
infringes the copyright holder's reproduction right.").
140. Id. at 130 ("In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the identity
of the infringer are never in doubt. These cases turn on whether the conduct in question does, in
fact, infringe the plaintiffs copyright. In this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the
authorship of the infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record,
and that program airs, a copy of the program-a copyrighted work-resides on the hard disks of
Cablevision's Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is
who made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is
the customer, plaintiffs' theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary
liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.").
141. Id. at 129 ("No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2
seconds.").
142. Id. at 127.
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definition of "copies"143 the court was not convinced that the
defendant's temporarily buffered data amounted to "copies" of the
plaintiffs protected material as defined by the Copyright Act. 144
While the Ninth Circuit, in MAI v. Peak,145 had suggested that
the creation of even a fleeting digital copy by the defendant could
amount to direct infringement of the reproduction right,146 the
Cartoon Network court distinguished MAI on the basis of its
interpretation of the statutory definition of "copies." 47 Referring back
to the statute, the Cartoon Network court held that two elements must
exist for the court to find an infringing reproduction of a copyrighted
work: The copying must occur (a) in a medium from which it may be
perceived and (b) for a period of more than transitory duration.148
In examining the M I decision, the Cartoon Network court
found that the earlier court had failed to provide more than a cursory
reference to the latter element. 149 Thus the MAI holding could only
stand as authority for the proposition that
loading a program into a computer's RAM can result in copying that program. We do
not read MAI Systems as holding that, as a matter of law, loading a program into a form
of RAM always results in such copying. Such a holding would read the 'transitory
duration' language out of the definition .... 150
Ultimately, the Cartoon Network court held that the buffering
of small amounts of the plaintiffs' data for fleeting amounts of time did
143. Id. (holding that "copies" in the Copyright Act means only those works that are
embodied in a medium (the embodiment requirement), which exists for more than a transient
duration (the duration requirement)).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("'Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term 'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.").
145. MAI Sys. Corp., v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
146. Id.; see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 302 ("To correct problems in the MAI
computers, Peak's technicians frequently made use of the diagnostic software built into the
machines, which automatically loaded into the computer's RAM every time the computer was
turned on. The court accepted MAI's argument that it licensed the software only to the
purchasers of the machines and that the service firm's copying of the software into the machine's
RAM constituted infringement.").
147. See source cited and explanation supra note 143.
148. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127. With respect to the definition of "copies", the
Copyright Act further defines the notion of fixation in the following terms: "A work is 'fixed' in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ... by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration ..... 17 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added).
149. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 128.
150. Id.
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not infringe the reproduction right.151 The copied data remained in
the defendant's buffer for only a transitory period of time.152 Thus, the
duration requirement inherent in the statutory definition of "copies"
was not satisfied. 158
The infringement analysis with respect to the playback copies
stored on the defendant's servers at its customers' request was more
complex. It was not immediately clear who was directly responsible
for making the infringing reproductions of the plaintiffs' works:
Cablevision or its customers. 154  As between the defendant's
customers, who actively chose which programs would be recorded, and
the defendant itself, which simply enabled the recording, the court
opined that the customers were more appropriately defined as the
creators of the copies. 155 In analyzing this issue, the judges likely
considered the implications of the strict liability doctrine, and whether
in the case of purely mechanical processes, the entity providing the
copying service should be held directly liable.
In its holding, the court followed an earlier line of Internet
cases that seemed to chip away at the strict liability doctrine in the
151. Id. at 130 ("Given that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2 seconds before
being automatically overwritten, and in the absence of compelling arguments to the contrary, we
believe that the copyrighted works here are not 'embodied' in the buffers for a period of more
than transitory duration, and are therefore not 'fixed' in the buffers. Accordingly, the acts of
buffering in the operation of the RS-DVR do not create copies, as the Copyright Act defines that
term.").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 129 ("No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds.
And unlike the data in cases like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in the computer's
RAM memory until the user turned the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and
automatically overwritten as soon as it is processed . . . . [T]hese facts strongly suggest that the
works in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a 'transitory' period, thus failing the
duration requirement.").
154. Id. at 130 ("In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the identity
of the infringer are never in doubt. These cases turn on whether the conduct in question does, in
fact, infringe the plaintiffs copyright. In this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the
authorship of the infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record,
and that program airs, a copy of the program- a copyrighted work- resides on the hard disks of
Cablevision's Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is
who made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is
the customer, plaintiffs' theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary
liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.").
155. Id. at 131 ("In the case of a VCR, it seems clear-and we know of no case holding
otherwise-that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the
recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures,
maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-
DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct
infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer's
command.").
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online context. 15 6  Presumably the reason for this approach had
something to do with the need to balance copyright protection against
the public policy of encouraging innovation in new technologies that
might enable copying. 57 The Cartoon Network court employed an
approach adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving
individual copying that had been enabled by an Internet service
provider. 15 8 The earlier case had imposed a "volition" requirement in
the context of direct infringement. 5 9 In other words, the plaintiff
needed to prove that the defendant's conduct was volitional rather
than a largely automated technological process. 160  This volition
requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on strict liability to
accommodate technological innovation.
Applying the volition test to the case at hand, the Cartoon
Network court compared the new technology with a more familiar
analogue:
There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision's conduct in
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a
customer's conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In
the case of a VCR, it seems clear . .. that the operator of the VCR, the person who
actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of
volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator,
owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently
distinguishable from a VCR customer to impose liability as a direct infringer on a
different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer's
command.
16 1
The problem for the plaintiffs in this situation is that if the
defendant is not liable for direct copying, there is a strong argument
that it would not be secondarily liable for the direct infringements of
its customers either. Because of existing Supreme Court precedent in
156. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (declining to impose direct liability on an Internet service provider with respect
to content that was posted on its service by one of its customers on the basis that "although
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation
which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.").
157. See MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) ("MGM and many
of the amici fault the Court of Appeals's holding for upsetting a sound balance between the
respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright
infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.").
158. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
159. Id. at 1370 ("Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be
some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used
to create a copy by a third party.").
160. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 ("When there is a dispute as to the author of an
allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the
volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.").
161. Id.
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Sony Corp. of America v University City Studios, Inc.162 it seems
unlikely that those customers using the defendant's RS-DVR services
would be regarded by a court as primary infringers. Thus, no
secondary liability could attach to the entity that made the copying
technology available. The Supreme Court in Sony held that customers
using a Betamax video recorder to record television programs for "time
shifting" purposes-to watch later on-were, in fact, making fair use
of the copyrighted works.163 Thus, there was no primary copyright
infringement for which the manufacturers of the Betamax recorders
could be secondarily liable. The Supreme Court in Sony also
incorporated a "staple article of commerce" doctrine into copyright
law,164 holding that the manufacturer or distributor of a product that
could be used to make infringing copies of protected works, but that
also had "substantial non-infringing uses," would not be liable for
copyright infringement.165
This may be why the plaintiffs "expressly disavowed" a claim of
secondary liability against the defendant in Cartoon Network.166
Presumably both of the holdings from Sony might have applied in the
Cartoon Network context if the plaintiffs had attempted to proceed
against the defendant on the basis of secondary liability for alleged
direct infringements by its customers. Establishing primary
infringement on which to base a claim of secondary liability, would
have required the plaintiffs to argue around both holdings in Sony-a
difficult task in practice.
In addition to their claim that Cablevision had directly
infringed their reproduction rights, the Cartoon Network plaintiffs
argued that Cablevision was directly liable for infringing their public
performance rights. 67  Early Internet cases had distinguished
between an online service provider's direct liability under the
162. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
163. Id. at 454-55 ("[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the District
Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.").
164. Id. at 442 ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.").
165. Id.
166. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 ("The question is who made [the playback copies].
If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most,
secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by the plaintiffs.").
167. Id. at 134 ("Plaintiffs' final theory is that Cablevision will violate the Copyright Act
by engaging in unauthorized public performances of their works through the playback of RS-
DVR copies."); see 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006) (setting out the exclusive right "in the case of ...
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly").
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reproduction right and other rights, such as public display and
performance rights. 168 It was therefore possible, based on existing
precedent, for a defendant to be liable for infringing the performance
right, but not liable for infringing the reproduction right.169 However,
the Cartoon Network court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish Cablevision's direct liability for the unauthorized public
performance of their works. 170 While it was possible that Cablevision
had "performed" the works, the court held that any such performance
would not be directed "to the public" as contemplated by the Copyright
Act.171
An examination of the precise technical operation of the
defendant's RS-DVR system supports the court's holding.172 When a
customer programs the RS-DVR to make a copy of a given program, an
individual copy of the program is made on a portion of the defendant's
server dedicated to that particular customer. 173 In other words, if
more than one customer requests a recording of the same program, an
individual copy is made for each of those customers in a dedicated
168. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-
71 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("It is clear from the context of this discussion that the Playboy court
[Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)] was looking only at the
exclusive right to distribute copies to the public, where liability exists regardless of whether the
defendant makes copies. Here, however, plaintiffs do not argue that Netcom is liable for its
public distribution of copies. Instead, they claim that Netcom is liable because its computers in
fact made copies. Therefore, the above-quoted language has no bearing on the issue of direct
liability for unauthorized reproductions. Notwithstanding Playboy's holding that a BBS operator
may be directly liable for distributing or displaying to the public copies of protected works, this
court holds that the storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and retransmission to
other servers is not a direct infringement by the BBS operator of the exclusive right to reproduce
the work where such copies are uploaded by an infringing user. Playboy does not hold
otherwise.").
169. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 ("[W]e note that our conclusion . . . that the
customer, not Cablevision, 'does' the copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the
customer, and not Cablevision, 'performs' the copyrighted work.").
170. Id. at 139.
171. Id. at 134 ("[Elven if we assume that Cablevision makes the transmission when as
RS-DVR playback occurs, we find that the RS-DVR playback . . . does not involve the
transmission of a performance 'to the public."').
172. Id. at 124-25 ("If a customer has requested a particular program, the data for that
program move from the primary buffer into a secondary buffer, and then onto a portion of one of
the hard disks allocated to that customer. . . . To begin playback, the customer selects the show
from an on-screen list of previously recorded programs. The principle difference in operation
[between a set-top recorder and the RS-DVR] is that, instead of sending signals from the remote
to an on-set box, the viewer sends signals from the remote, through the cable, to the Arroyo
Server at Cablevision's central facility. In this respect, RS-DVR more closely resembles a VOD
[video-on-demand] service, whereby a cable subscriber uses his remote and cable box to request
transmission of content, such as a movie, stored on computers at the cable company's facility.
But unlike a VOD service, RS-DVR users can only play content that they previously requested to
be recorded.").
173. Id.
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space on the defendant's servers. Each customer can only play back
the copy from her own dedicated space on Cablevision's servers.174
Earlier courts had held that if digital consumers are all capable of
receiving a transmission at the same time, but in different places, this
may amount to a performance "to the public."17 5 The definition of
performing a work "to the public" in the Copyright Act contemplates
transmitting the work "by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive
it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times."176
Interpreting this definition, the Cartoon Network court focused
on defining a "transmission" for the purposes of a performance "to the
public."1 77 While acknowledging that the law on this point is not
particularly clear, the court deemed it necessary to establish who is
capable of receiving the transmission to establish whether the
transmission was to the public.178 In the case of the RS-DVR service,
because only one individual could receive any given playback
transmission, the court held that Cablevision could not have infringed
the plaintiffs' public performance right.17 9
While the court did not expressly address any concerns about
strict liability in the context of direct infringement of the public
performance right, that likely was an underlying concern. In the
digital world, courts are constantly faced with the tension between
technological innovation and artistic creation. 80  Holding
174. Id.
175. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (holding that an Internet service provider was not directly liable for infringing the
plaintiffs reproduction right); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that an Internet service provider could be directly liable for infringing the plaintiffs
public distribution and public display rights).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added) (defining performance of a work "to the
public").
177. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 136) ("Although the transmit clause is not a model of
clarity, we believe that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it
refers to the performance created by the act of transmission.").
178. Id.
179. Id. at 139 ("In sum, we find that the transmit clause directs us to identify the
potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons 'capable of receiving' it, to determine
whether that transmission is 'made to the public.' Because each RS-DVR playback transmission
is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we
conclude that such transmissions are not performances 'to the public,' and therefore do not
infringe any right of public performance.").
180. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) ("MGM and many
of the amici fault the Court of Appeals's holding for upsetting a sound balance between the
respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright
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technological innovators strictly liable for services they provide is
likely to impede innovation in socially valuable technologies. 181 As a
policy matter, courts in the digital age generally seem to err on the
side of finding such technological innovators, at most, secondarily
liable for their customers' infringements. 182 This allows courts to focus
more on doctrines such as contributory liability, which carries a mens
rea requirement. 183 Focusing on contributory liability allows courts
more flexibility to discourage uses of innovative technologies
conducted predominantly for infringing purposes, while protecting
technologies that may have broader non-infringing purposes. 184
As a policy matter, the outcome of the Cartoon Network case
may be problematic. The case may be seen as a blueprint for future
technological innovators to avoid copyright liability by coding their
services such that their customers can only access an individual copy
of a given work. This could avoid strict liability under the public
performance right. The Cartoon Network court was quick to note that
its holding should not be read in that light and that future innovators
who attempt to code around the public performance right might
nevertheless be liable under other rights reserved to a copyright
holder:
This holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content delivery networks
to avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating
one unique copy with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the
capacity to make their own individual copies. We do not address whether such a
network operator would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such as
liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory infringement. 185
infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.").
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., id.; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
183. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 438 ("The doctrine of contributory infringement originates
in tort law and stems from the principle that one who directly contributes to another's
infringement should be held accountable. In other words, the common law doctrine is applicable
under copyright law. That is, one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is
jointly and severally liable for the principal tortfeasor."); Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at
402 ("The innocence or culpable intent of an infringer is also relevant- and often dispositive- in
cases of contributory infringement. In spite of the longstanding 'unanimity of view' in favor of
strict liability for direct and vicarious infringers of copyright, courts premise liability for
contributory infringement, in part, on the intent or knowledge of the contributory infringer.
Indeed, in stark contrast to other variants of infringement, knowledge is the very 'touchstone' of
contributory infringement.").
184. Of course one might argue that if the focus is on secondary infringement, vicarious
liability (like direct liability) attracts strict liability. However, in practice, decisions on vicarious
liability in cases that also involve contributory liability seem to follow whatever the court has
said about strict liability. A number of digital copyright cases have decided the contributory and
vicarious liability questions in favor of the same parties. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l
Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2008); A&MRecords, 239 F. 3d 1004.
185. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Despite the court's suggestion that future innovators could be held
liable under the reproduction right,186 the case itself provides useful
guidance on how to avoid that result in practice. As long as a service
provider has not actually made illegal copies of a copyrighted work of
its own volition, that service provider will not be strictly liable under
the reproduction right. Thus, if a potential defendant codes its system
so that another entity is regarded as making the copies in question, it
can escape direct liability under the reproduction right.
However, contributory liability poses a different question,
depending on the operation of the system. If someone uses the system
to make illegal copies, or otherwise infringe a copyright holder's
exclusive rights, a technological innovator may be contributorily liable
for that person's infringements. Because contributory liability
requires the plaintiff to establish some form of intent by the
defendant, this may achieve a better balance between the often
competing public policy aims of encouraging artistic creativity while
still fostering technological innovation.
C. Online "Copytraps" and Strict Liability
In addition to these contexts, strict liability theory creates
other challenges, many of which arise from the architecture of the
Internet. A system that operates on the basis of running copies of
software code and that encourages global participation in
communications of the "cut and paste" variety will raise a number of
questions for copyright law and policy. "To punish innocent copying
on the Internet is to punish virtual existence, and copyright's strict
liability does just that. Strict punishment of copying makes no sense
in a world where copying is the architecture of being."18 7
Of particular concern are situations Professor Snow describes
as "copytraps."188 These scenarios involve the category of innocent
infringement that results from a third party misleading the infringer
into believing that the work belongs to the third party or that the
third party is otherwise legally entitled to authorize copying. 189
186. Id.
187. Snow, supra note 8, at 286.
188. Id. at 286-87 ("A copytrap exists where a Web site leads an Internet user to
mistakenly believe that a copyrighted work may be legally downloaded when in fact the work is
pirated. Those circumstances trap the innocent downloader, who faces strict liability for
unauthorized copying.").
189. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 539 (noting that strict liability will apply even in
situations where a defendant "has relied on a putative author's misrepresentations about the
originality of work."); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 ("Then there is the situation wherein the
defendant's work is based upon a work furnished by a third party. The defendant's ignorance
that such third party has wrongfully copied from the plaintiff will not immunize him from
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Professor Snow argues that the application of strict liability in these
cases is particularly harsh because a person who procures a work
online must, by necessity, make a copy by downloading it.190
Online models of distribution generally involve copying as a
matter of necessity. Thus, these models are not really comparable
with physical world distribution models. In the physical world, a
person who procures a copy of an infringing work is not herself
required to copy it to enjoy it. While someone who mistakenly believes
that she has a right to copy someone else's work may be held strictly
liable for copyright infringement, the mere fact of procuring a physical
copy of a protected work does not warrant copyright liability in the
physical world. 191
Applying strict liability to distribution of works online thus
effectively traps everyone who downloads a protected work in the
mistaken belief that she has the right to do so, for example, because
she paid for access to a service, unaware that it was a service
distributing pirated copies of protected works. Online, the strict
liability approach to infringement traps both innocent intentional
copiers and unwary procurers of works. This is because, in the online
world, intentional reproduction, as well as simply purchasing or
procuring a work involve copying. 192
Many courts and commentators have traditionally been
sympathetic to copyright holders in cases where it is costly and
difficult for them to prove or disprove the copier's state of mind. 193
Unconscious copying is a significant example of a situation in which it
liability."); Sinclair, supra note 1, at 950 (describing as a class of innocent infringement "good
faith use of infringing matter received from others in circumstances warranting the reasonable
assumption that it is original material").
190. Snow, supra note 8, at 295-96 ("Punishing innocent downloaders is unfair because
it contravenes the Internet model for copyright distribution. Copyright holders who distribute
their works through the Internet rely on consumers to download those works. Internet
distribution requires consumer copying.").
191. Id. at 296-97 ("In real space, distribution of copyright works occurs by copyright
holders making available physical copies for the public to consume. If consumers in real space
seek to legitimately obtain a copyrighted work, they must procure a physical copy of that work
rather than making a copy. This fact suggests that a presumption against consumer copying
exists. Absent affirmative circumstances suggesting that an author has relinquished her rights
or that copying would constitute a fair use, there is no reason for consumers to copy the work.
Thus, the real-space model for distributing copyright works-physical delivery-suggests that
copyright holders do not authorize consumer copying. Unlike the model of cyberspace
distribution, the real-space model inherently suggests that consumer copying is not
authorized.").
192. Id.
193. Id. at 299 ("In real space, strict liability is warranted because circumstances giving
rise to a reasonable mistake of fact about whether copying is permissible can be difficult to
disprove. The difficulty of proof arises because in real space only exceptional circumstances could
lead a person to mistakenly believe that copying is authorized.").
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is almost impossible, if not actually impossible, for the copyright
holder to establish the defendant's state of mind.194
Even in the physical world, innocent copying in reliance on a
false representation made by a third party may be difficult for a
copyright holder to litigate in the absence of strict liability,
particularly if the copier alleges a verbal representation by a third
party.195 Where there is no written representation purportedly
authorizing the illegal copying, it may be extremely difficult for a
plaintiff to establish whether or not the defendant or the third party is
lying about the verbal representation. This may be another reason for
erring on the side of strict liability in the physical world, despite the
numerous criticisms of the doctrine in that context.196
In the digital world, however, it may be much easier to
establish the existence of a third party representation falsely
authorizing illegal downloading.197 Many have criticized the
Internet's architecture for the permanence of information, particularly
personally sensitive information, residing online. 198 However, this
permanent quality of the Internet provides certain advantages in the
online downloading or copying context. With many webpages cached,
reproduced, and otherwise permanently stored on various servers,
false representations made by a third party may be much easier to
find than they would be in the physical world. 199 There will likely be a
written record of those representations on some server.200 Thus, it
194. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Snow, supra note 8, at 299 ("[In cases of
subconscious copying] an infringer might forget that she has seen a copyrighted image and then
subconsciously copy the image when creating a new work. Disproving a false allegation that her
infringement results from subconscious copying would be pragmatically impossible, for only the
infringer knows her consciousness. For this reason, strict liability in real space has received
support.").
195. Snow, supra note 8, at 299. ("Cyberspace, on the other hand, [as opposed to the
physical world] does not usually raise the same difficulty of disproving allegations of innocence . .
. . In the downloading context, the reasonableness of an infringer's mistaken fact would be
limited to the conclusions that a reasonable person would draw from the appearance of the Web
site at issue. Because the circumstances leading to the alleged mistake of fact are readily
observable on the Web site, it would not be difficult to disprove a false allegation of innocence.
Circumstances outside of the Web site's appearance- such as representations by other persons in
real space- would not likely be sufficient to overcome a conclusion that a Web site's downloads
appear unauthorized. So unlike in real space, a false allegation of innocence would not be
difficult to disprove in cyberspace.").
196. See discussion supra Part I.C.
197. Snow, supra note 8, at 299.
198. DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 33 (2007) ('"The Internet ... makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that
never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than
a second.").
199. Snow, supra note 8, at 299.
200. See source cited and explanation, supra note 195.
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may be appropriate to inject a mens rea element into direct
infringement liability involving such websites, and give innocent
defendants a chance to prove that they relied on the false
representations to avoid liability. 201
Professor Snow also raises the concern, with respect to online
copytraps, that plaintiffs may be more likely to pursue innocent
infringers in the online context than intentional infringers. 202 Online,
innocent infringers are less likely to mask their identities and
locations-believing they have nothing to hide-than intentional
infringers who know they are committing unauthorized acts.203 It is
relatively easy for a copyright holder to locate and sue a person who is
not trying to mask her online presence. 204 The copyright holder may
employ various means such as Google searches, 205 chat room
inquiries, 206 or, ultimately, seeking identifying information directly
from an Internet service provider under relevant provisions of the
Copyright Act. 20 7 This may play out differently in the physical world
depending on the ease with which a plaintiff can locate innocent
versus intentional infringers in practice.208
Imposing strict liability on innocent downloaders may also
negatively impact market competition for online distribution of
works. 209  Because the Internet offers a nearly costless global
distribution model, one might hope that smaller market players would
be encouraged to compete with larger, more established market
participants. 2 10 This would lead to greater competition and potentially
more choices and lower costs for consumers. 211  However, the
201. Snow, supra note 8, at 299.
202. Id. at 303-04 ("[The cost of identifying innocent infringers is likely to be lower than
the cost of identifying intentional infringers. Because intentional infringers know that they are
infringing, they may employ technological means to hide their infringement. Innocent infringers,
on the other hand, believe that their downloads are authorized, and so they lack any reason to
avoid detection. They accordingly are usually easier to identify.").
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 303 ("In cyberspace, the cost of identifying infringers is quickly dropping.
From simple Google searches to chat room inquiries, a copyright holder can quickly identify Web
sites that pirate the copyright holder's works. Inquiries with ISPs will then yield the
identification of the end user infringer.").
206. Id.
207. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1) (2006) ("A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the
owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordance with this subsection.").
208. Snow, supra note 8, at 299.
209. Id. at 306-11 (describing relevant market issues with strict liability for online
copyright infringement).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 308 ("[T]he commercial value of virtual markets lies in their distributive
efficiencies. Virtual markets allow for relatively costless distribution: anyone can distribute ideas
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imposition of strict liability on consumers who download works-and
hence make copies of them-might encourage consumers to gravitate
to more traditional, well-established commercial entities online. 212
Consumers would likely assume that these sites are trustworthy and
thus more likely to only offer legal merchandise. 213 They may even
believe that such sites would assume liability for any problems arising
through use of their services. 2 14  Because of concerns about risks of
inadvertent illegal downloading, consumers therefore would gravitate
to larger, more well-known, commercial websites, such as iTunes for
music, rather than smaller, lesser-known sites, 215 like Creative
Commons, which offers material on its website for free downloading. 216
However, Creative Commons makes no guarantees about copyright
holder authorization to download. 217  Thus, consumers may be
deterred from downloading the free material, even in cases where
downloads are legitimately authorized. 218 Professor Snow summarizes
his concerns about the potential for online copytraps as follows:
The tension between a law designed for real space and the ontology of cyberspace must
be addressed. If the Internet is to draw widespread participation, it requires fairness
for the unwary. If the Internet is to fuel the vehicle of commerce, it requires assurances
for good-faith purchasers. If the Internet is to breed a marketplace of ideas, it requires
breathing space for its speakers. The Internet's great potential for commercial and
information exchange may be realized only if innocent actors are not dissuaded from
participating. 2 19
to a global market through the Internet. By eliminating the high cost of distribution, the
Internet gives rise to myriad commercial enterprises.").
212. Id. at 309 ("Strict liability punishment of innocent downloaders threatens this
virtual model for efficient competition. If users become reluctant to download from sites where
material could possibly be infringing, then they will download only from sites that they trust.
Trusted sites would be those that have gained an established reputation of credibility. Trusted
sites would be name-brand sites- those whose reputation precludes the possibility that they are
transient, jurisdictionally judgment-proof piracy sites.").
213. Id.
214. Id. ("[T]rusted sites would be indemnifying sites- those that assume responsibility
for the content of a download. Concerned about possibly downloading infringing material, users
would download only from trusted sites.").
215. Id. ("A shift in consumer preference for trusted Web sites would create a
comparative advantage. Internet users would continue to download from iTunes.com, whereas
they would be reluctant to download from CreativeCommons.org. Consumers would be confident
that the iTunes site would assume responsibility for the content of its music downloads. The
Creative Commons sites, on the other hand, would lack that consumer confidence.").
216. Id. ("Creative Commons offers material for free download, representing that
copyright holders have authorized the downloads, but the site does not warrant the authenticity
of copyright holder authorization.").
217. Id.
218. Id. ("Strict liability would place [pro bono websites such as Creative Commons] at a
disadvantage to larger name-brand corporate sites. The deterrence of end-user downloading
would pose a significant barrier for many lesser- known sites to establish the credibility
necessary for competition. Trusted sites would be safe; questionable sites would suffer.").
219. Id. at 328.
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The concerns raised by Professor Snow beg the question
whether any reconsideration of strict liability in copyright law should
apply only to the virtual world. Professor Snow makes some good
points about the fundamental differences between the virtual world
and the physical world that may implicate a need to reconsider the
application of the strict liability doctrine online. However, he appears
to accept a number of the justifications for retaining the strict liability
doctrine in the physical world. 220 Both offline and online critiques of
the strict liability doctrine raise real concerns about the harshness of
its application in various circumstances. 2 2 1 However, it is unclear
whether the concerns about strict liability justify reconsideration of
the doctrine generally, or only in specific contexts, such as online
downloading.
III. MITIGATING THE HARSHNESS OF STRICT LIABILITY
Assuming good reasons to mitigate the harshness of the strict
liability approach to direct copyright infringement exist, particularly
given the prevalence of digital copying technologies and the structure
of the Internet, the question arises as to how best to tackle the
problem. One could attempt specific legislative amendments that
would modify the operation of the doctrine either in general or in
specific digital contexts, or one could continue to focus on remedies,
which is the current practice under statutory copyright law. 22 2 In the
absence of legislative action, the task of better defining the contours of
developing common law concepts like "volition" in the direct copying
context may fall to the courts.223
This Part concentrates on four potential approaches to
mitigating the harshness of strict liability. Some are of more general
application while others are sector-specific. The reform options
comprise: (a) making innocent infringement into an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement, 2 24 (b) requiring proof of a mens rea
element to establish liability for direct infringement, (c) developing an
administrative mechanism through which an agency might excuse
220. Id. at 295-97 (distinguishing between application of strict liability in the physical
world and in the virtual world).
221. See discussion supra, Parts LC, II.C.
222. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2 (noting that the innocence of the defendant "may.
bear upon the remedies available against such a defendant").
223. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party.").
224. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 421 ("Congress should establish innocence as
an affirmative defense to monetary liability.").
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certain types of innocent infringement from copyright liability, and (d)
excusing an innocent downloader from copyright infringement in the
online copytrap context. 225
A. Innocent Infringement as an Affirmative Defense
The idea of amending the Copyright Act to incorporate
innocent infringement as an affirmative defense is not new.2 2 6 If such
an approach were adopted, it would raise questions as to how precisely
the defense should operate in practice and whether it should be a
defense of general application or limited to specific contexts, such as
online downloading. The rationale for the latter approach would be
that online downloading significantly alters the balance of harms in
copyright laW2 2 7 and impedes the free flow of ideas in an important
global communications medium.228 Thus, while it may be acceptable
to maintain strict liability in the physical world, innocent
infringement should be a defense in online downloading cases.
However, as copyright legislation tends to operate in a
relatively general way, rather than focusing on specific spheres of
activity, it may be more practical to craft a general innocent
infringement defense, rather than a sector-specific approach. On the
other hand, the advantages of focusing on Internet downloads would
be limiting the defense to a sphere in which innocent copying may be
particularly troubling as a policy matter. Thus copyright holders
would retain the benefits of strict liability in other areas where the
doctrine may be more readily justified.
Regardless of whether an innocent intent defense is of general
application or is adopted in a sector-specific manner, certain questions
remain. For example, should the defense be limited to monetary
liability, or should it also cover injunctive relief? Some commentators
have suggested it would be appropriate for such a defense to focus on
monetary relief.229 This would enable the copyright holder prospective
protection against unauthorized copying in the form of injunctive
225. Snow, supra note 8, at 323 ('The [Copyright] Act should excuse innocent
downloaders from financial liability where a downloader infringes under a mistaken belief that is
reasonable. Reasonableness would be determined by the appearance of a Web site. If a Web site's
appearance suggests that a download is infringing, the downloader's mistaken belief that the
download is legal would not excuse financial liability.").
226. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 421 (suggesting the adoption of an express
defense of innocent infringement in the Copyright Act).
227. Snow, supra note 8, at 295-97 (distinguishing between application of strict liability
in the physical world and in the virtual world).
228. Id. at 328.
229. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 421 ("Congress should establish innocence as
an affirmative defense to monetary liability.").
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relief.230 Naturally, any subsequent copying by the defendant could
not qualify as "innocent."231
Adopting an innocence defense in copyright law would also
require a determination of who would bear the burden of proof in
establishing the defense. One approach is that copyright owners
might first be required to establish a prima facie case of
infringement. 2 32  At that point, the burden would shift to the
defendant to establish her innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence.233 Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to establish
innocence mitigates some of the concerns raised by proponents of
strict liability, particularly in relation to difficulties potentially faced
by plaintiffs in establishing a defendant's state of mind.2 3 4
As with the fair use defense, 235 placing the burden on the
defendant to establish her innocence may nevertheless chill legitimate
expression, both in the online and offline contexts. Individual
defendants may not have the financial wherewithal to defend a
copyright infringement action and thus deterred from copying in the
first place. Further, in some cases it may be almost as difficult for the
defendant to adduce objective evidence of her state of mind as it would
be for the plaintiff to do so. In cases where the defendant has engaged
in unconscious copying, for example, or has relied on a verbal false
representation by a third party, she may have no way of establishing
her own state of mind.
However, to the extent that the theoretical underpinning for
strict liability is based on the idea that it is easier for the defendant to
bear the burden of proving her innocent state of mind than the
plaintiff, an innocence defense may still afford some comfort to
potential defendants. Under the strict liability approach, defendants
are liable regardless of their state of mind.2 3 6 An innocence defense at
least gives them the opportunity to attempt to establish, to the
satisfaction of the court, that they acted with innocent intent. As
230. Id. ("If successful, the innocent infringer would be relieved of monetary liability.
Significantly, however, the infringer's innocence would not preclude the copyright owner from
seeking and obtaining prospective relief, including preliminary or permanent injunctions against
future infringement.").
231. Id. ("Indeed, any copying after the issuance of such an injunction could never qualify
as 'innocent."').
232. Id. ("[O]nce the copyright owner establishes a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, an innocent infringer could then undertake to prove that he 'had no reason to
believe that his acts constituted infringement.' . . . ITihe infringer would bear the burden of
proving his own innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.").
233. Id.
234. See discussion supra Part I.A.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
236. See generally supra Part I.
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between the plaintiff and the defendant, there is still no strong
justification for putting the burden on the plaintiff to establish the
defendant's state of mind.
B. Intent as an Element of the Infringement Action
Adopting a legislative amendment to incorporate intent as an
element of a primary infringement action would likely be more
problematic in practice than establishing an innocence defense. If, in
fact, it is much more difficult for a plaintiff to prove a defendant's
state of mind than for a defendant to do so, the incorporation of an
intent element into the infringement action is untenable. As long as
the plaintiff is expected to make out her cause of action before
considering available defenses, it would impose an impossible burden
on copyright plaintiffs to establish the defendant's guilty mind as part
of the prima facie case. Thus, while amending the Copyright Act to
incorporate intent as an element of an infringement action is
technically possible, it would be highly problematic in practice.
In the alternative, intent could be incorporated into the
infringement action in certain sector-specific cases, such as innocent
downloading of protected material. Given that content owners
criticized for indiscriminately suing individual downloaders of
protected content, 237 requiring those copyright owners to establish a
guilty intent on the part of the downloader makes some sense.
However, a neater solution to the approach of innocent downloading
may still be found through the innocence defense approach, 238 rather
than through tinkering with the elements of the action. It is easier for
a court or legislature to exempt conduct from liability as a defense,
rather than alter the boundaries of the initial cause of action. This
approach makes sense because most defenses, at least in the copyright
context, focus on the position of the defendant, 239 while initial causes
of action focus more on the plaintiffs position-specifically, on
infringements of the plaintiffs rights.
237. See, e.g., JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 99
(2011) (criticizing the onslaught of legal suits by the RIAA against its customers).
238. Snow, supra note 8, at 323 ("The [Copyright] Act should excuse innocent
downloaders from financial liability where a downloader infringes under a mistaken belief that is
reasonable.").
239. Of course some defenses, such as contributory liability in the tort of negligence,
focus more on the actions of the plaintiff in contributing to her own harm, but the proposition
generally rings true in the copyright context in the case of defenses such as fair use and first




Another possibility for mitigating the harshness of the strict
liability doctrine would be for Congress to delegate the power to
exempt certain classes of activities from infringement to an
administrative agency. This would resemble the procedure adopted in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) empowering the
Librarian of Congress to conduct a triennial review of the application
of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions and to exempt certain
classes of works from infringement. 2 4 0  It may be possible for an
administrative body to make ex ante determinations of certain classes
of innocent infringement. This approach might inject some relatively
clear guidelines into the system about the kinds of uses that typically
should not constitute a copyright infringement.
An obvious advantage of this approach is that it allows
participation in the process by those who use copyright works but who
may not have the funds to defend an action brought by a copyright
holder. Presumably, making submissions to an administrative body
will be cheaper and easier than defending a court action.
Additionally, the administrative exemption approach potentially gives
participants in the copyright system some ex ante guidance as to
whether a particular use will be found infringing. If the
administrative agency has exempted a certain type of use as an
"innocent infringement," future parties engaging in that use can take
some comfort that they will not incur liability for copyright
infringement. This will potentially avoid at least some litigation
altogether.
The devil would be in the details. How easy would it be for an
administrative body to make specific determinations on classes of
conduct that amount to innocent infringement without being over-
inclusive or under-inclusive? Is this a task best left to the executive,
the courts, or the legislature? To what extent could courts review an
administrative determination that a particular use should be regarded
as an innocent infringement? How easy would it be for them to deal
with conflicts over the interpretation of a particular administrative
exemption? Perhaps this approach simply adds an additional layer of
cost and complexity to an already complex area of the law.
D. Excusing Innocent Downloaders
Returning to actions that legislatures or courts could take to
mitigate the harshness of strict liability in copyright, Professor Snow
240. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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has advocated an exemption to copyright liability for innocent
downloaders of protected online content. 24 1 His suggestion would be
limited to copying resulting from downloading content from a website
where a false representation or impression had been created as to the
legality of the download. 24 2
As an alternative to a legislative amendment, Professor Snow
suggests judicial action.243 Courts are empowered to create a judicial
"innocent downloading" defense by creatively interpreting the
damages provisions of the Copyright Act. 2 4 4 In Professor Snow's view,
a court could interpret the damages provisions in the Act as
inapplicable to innocent downloaders. 245 He also suggests that courts
have the power to recognize a new affirmative defense where a statute
does not specifically provide for one, in cases where the defense is
necessary to "avoid injustice, oppression, absurd consequences, or
constitutional infirmities, and where recognizing the defense would
not ignore legislative intent."24 6 Thus, if a defendant could establish
to a court's satisfaction that accepting an innocent downloading
defense to infringement would avoid injustice or perhaps even
constitutional problems in chilling speech, the court may be persuaded
to create such a defense.247
The suggestion of an affirmative defense for innocent
downloading is intriguing. It would allow the system to adopt an
innocence defense in a limited context and to evaluate any unforeseen
problems that may ensue in considering such a defense more broadly
in other applications of copyright law. Professor Snow seems to
contemplate a burden of proof on the defendant to establish the
"reasonableness" of her mistaken belief that her download was
authorized. 248
He further suggests that even an innocent downloader should
not be entitled to retain good title to copyright material she has
241. Snow, supra note 8, at 323 ("The [Copyright] Act should excuse innocent
downloaders from financial liability where a downloader infringers under a mistaken belief that
is reasonable.").
242. Id. ("Reasonableness would be determined by the appearance of a Web site. If a Web
site's appearance suggests that a download is infringing, a downloader's mistaken belief that the
download is legal would not excuse financial liability. A person viewing the same Web site as the
innocent downloader would need to reach the same mistaken belief.").
243. Id. at 327 ("In the event that Congress does not amend the Copyright Act, courts
must resolve the policy and constitutional issues.").
244. Id. ("[Courts could interpret] the damages provision of the [Copyright] Act as not




248. Id. at 323.
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innocently downloaded without authorization from the copyright
holder. 249 In this way, the law could mitigate the harshness of the
strict liability doctrine without depriving the copyright owner of her
rights to be paid for online distributions of her work.2 50 Of course,
enforcing an order that an individual downloader must delete an
unauthorized copy of a work may be extremely difficult in practice.
However, at least a statement in the legislation depriving the
downloader of good title expresses some deference to the rights of the
copyright holder. Additionally, if the original downloader failed to
delete the infringing material, she would no longer be an innocent
infringer and would therefore be subject to statutory penalties for
violating the copyright. 251
Adopting an amendment to the Copyright Act to excuse
innocent downloading, along the lines suggested by Professor Snow,
may also provide a useful opportunity to explore whether a more
general innocence defense could work in the copyright infringement
context. A legislative amendment would be preferable to a judicially
created defense in this context. The legislature could address the
specific contours of the defense, including, for example, Professor
Snow's suggestions that a "reasonable belief' test should be built into
the exemption,252 and that an innocent downloader should be required
to delete content she had innocently downloaded. 253
While most of the proposals made here are controversial, it
may nevertheless be time to give these-and similar proposals-some
thought. Particularly in the context of the digital age, notions of strict
liability may be more problematic than they have been in the past.2 5 4
However, even before the Internet age, commentators had criticized
249. Id. at 324 ('The exception for innocent downloading should not endow innocent
downloaders with good title to infringement material .... The innocent downloader should not
retain the infringing material because otherwise he would be unjustly enriched beyond that
which directly resulted from his mistaken belief. He should be required to delete infringing
material upon receiving notice of the infringement.").
250. Id. ("Alleviating the deterrent effect of strict liability punishment is possible without
passing good title to the downloader .... By requiring the downloader to delete the material, the
author's efforts that gave rise to the expression would not be further exploited without
compensation.").
251. Id. ("If an innocent downloader fails to delete infringing material after receiving
notice of his infringement, the downloader would no longer be innocent. By ignoring the
copyright holder's notice of infringement, the downloader would effectively lose the protection
that his innocence provided him, for his purposeful ignorance would amount to a willful
violation. In that instance, statutory penalties for willful infringement should apply, reflecting
the law's intolerance for actors who abuse protections for the innocent to further unlawful
activity.").
252. Id. at 323.
253. Id. at 324-25.
254. Id.
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the strict liability approach to copyright infringement. 2 5 5 Perhaps the
rise of the digital age will give courts and legislatures the impetus
they need to reconsider strict liability in the copyright context.
TV. CONCLUSION
Historically, there have been good reasons for the strict
liability approach to claims of direct copyright infringement.256 At a
time when copyrights were typically registered under early copyright
systems and it was relatively easy for users to establish the existence
and ownership of a copyright, it seemed reasonable for them to bear
the risk of infringement. 25 7 However, as registration formalities have
faded away, the notice rationale is less convincing today than it may
have been in the past.2 5 8
Additionally, the rise of digital technologies has further
stretched the already attenuated reasoning behind strict liability. As
more copying processes become automated as part of a digital system,
it is often difficult to justify imposing liability on a party who has
merely enabled copying or incidentally copied in the act of innocently
downloading a work. Strict liability for copyright infringement in the
digital context, in particular, has the potential to seriously chill speech
and technological innovation. 259
It may be time for legislatures and courts to reconsider strict
liability, both because some of the original justifications for the
doctrine have fallen away in the modern world, and because strict
liability seems a poor fit for many newer digital technologies. There
are a number of possible avenues that legislatures and courts could
take to mitigate the harshness of strict liability in today's global
digital world. In fact, American courts seem to have made some first
steps in this direction by imposing a "volition" requirement on a direct
infringement action in certain digital contexts. 260 This may be a first
step toward broader changes to the strict liability doctrine to better
255. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11.
256. See discussion supra Part I.A.
257. See discussion supra Part I.A.
258. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 11, at 376 ("[C]opyright no longer mandates notice
and registration. The elimination of these requirements, which were hallmarks of the Statute of
Anne and all federal copyright legislation prior to the 1976 Act, has rendered current copyright
law a fenceless barren.").
259. See discussion supra Part II.C.
260. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party.").
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protect innocent infringers and to avoid chilling online speech and
technological innovation.
Another advantage of mitigating the harshness of strict
liability is that if the copyright system better protects innocent
infringers, it may encourage copyright owners to make greater use of
DRM technologies. Digital technologies enable copyright holders to
relatively easily give notice of their rights to potential downstream
users. 261 They can employ content management information to
identify their copyright ownership and the terms on which they are
prepared to license their works for downstream use. 2 6 2 Additionally,
they can employ a number of technological protective measures to
prohibit or limit unauthorized access to and use of their works. 263
More effective use of digital content management information
would avoid many cases of innocent infringement, because it would be
more difficult for infringers to argue that they did not have notice of a
copyright holder's rights, or thought the work was in the public
domain. Situations where the work was innocently procured in
reliance on false representations of a wrongdoer could be more
difficult to resolve if content management information was removed by
the wrongdoer. However, there are other ways of dealing with these
situations, such as the legislative or judicial exemption from innocent
downloading suggested by Professor Snow. 2 6 4 The strict liability
doctrine, a product of a prior time, which was meant to protect and
foster innovation, should not be used today in a manner that
inadvertently chills technological innovation.
261. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 107, § 12A.08 (discussing the value of protecting and
promoting copyright management information use in the digital age with reference to the 1998
legislative provisions in the DMCA adding new protections for CMI).
262. In fact, the DMCA incorporated new provisions protecting the integrity of "copyright
management information." 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006).
263. The DMCA also incorporated protections for such technological protection measures.
See id. § 1201(a), (b).
264. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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